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THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK
A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN*
There is a great deal to admire in all three of the papers pre-
sented in this session. This is hardly surprising as each of the present-
ers is in his own way an important pioneer in the emerging, if perhaps
soon evanescent,1 field of Internet Law; our host, Dean Perritt, has
been pioneering computer law longer than most of today's Internet
lawyers have been members of the bar. It happens, however, that I
see the commentator's role as being more about noting points of dis-
agreement than nodding contentedly-especially when asked to de-
liver a paper to a live audience which cannot politely turn the page or
click on another window.
To avoid boring agreement, I will concentrate on the one theme
found in each of the papers: the relationship of the Internet to the
causes and consequences of the rise of supra-nationalism. Parts I and
II summarize and occasionally quibble with the portions of the three
papers relevant to my theme. Despite my desire to be provocative, I
am forced to confess that all three papers are talking about the right
questions, and more often than not, are on target about the causes of
the developments they are examining. I will, however, take on the
role of devil's advocate in Part III, which explains why there is a risk
that the tensions discussed in all three papers may exacerbate the
worst aspects of this particular form of globalization. Indeed, when
one considers the reactions already brewing against bor-
der-subverting aspects of the Internet, the medium-term effects of the
communications revolution may be somewhat more nasty and
anti-democratic than anyone imagined.
It may seem odd that three papers in a symposium devoted to
the "new paradigms" relating to the Internet are directed, in whole or
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. Copyright © 1999 A. Michael Froomkin. All
rights reserved. I would like to thank Caroline Bradley, Dan Burk, Hank Perritt, and David
Post for their thoughtful comments, and the University of Miami for supporting this work with a
Summer Research Grant. Internet: froomkin@law.tm.
1. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 207. My own view is that most of what currently passes for Internet Law will become
sub-fields of other subjects-eventually.
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in part, to one of the hoariest of legal topics, the governance of na-
tions. Thus, for example, the Post and Johnson thought experiment is
at a sufficiently high level of generality that it concentrates on asking
questions about the role of law in society in general in the hopes of
generating answers applicable to the Internet.2 Similarly, the Perritt
paper looks at the effect of the Internet on the functioning of foreign
ministries and the international state system in general, and finds a
number of incremental improvements rather than new paradigms,3
while the Burk paper finds more of the same old rent-seeking and
strategic behavior.4
This focus on the state is not a coincidence or an error. It reflects
something real about the world we still live in: few if any nation-states
are in any hurry to relinquish their freedom of maneuver (read "con-
trol" or "power") to decentralizing, democratizing, even anarchistic
forces such as the Internet-at least not without a fight. And, as I
shall argue in Part III, the remedy that states find comes most easily
to hand is such strong medicine that it may be worse than the disease.
I. THE INTERNET CHALLENGE TO LAW-AND TO THE STATE
Dan Burk's paper provides a useful prism through which to or-
ganize one's thinking about all three papers. Burk's motivating ob-
servation appears forthrightly at the start: the "technological under-
pinnings of the network violate the assumptions embedded in many
current legal doctrines. ' He draws his main example from intellec-
tual property ("IP") law where the challenges of cheap speech and
regulatory arbitrage upset the traditional, sometimes. cozy, ways of
doing things enjoyed by those firms who find themselves being regu-
lated by obsolescing rules. These developments have similarly desta-
bilizing effects on the various law-generating institutions, mostly na-
tion-states and their political subdivisions, that are participants in the
"market" for legal systems. Legal scholarship, Burk implicitly asserts,
must take up the challenge of revising rules and counseling rulemak-
ers in the face of these new challenges.
2. See David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent": To-
wards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1055 (1998).
3. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 997 (1998).
4. See Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 943 (1998).
5. Id. at 943.
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Similarly, Dean Perritt describes the blurring effects he sees the
Internet having on categories of international law. He suggests that
by and large the proper response to these changes is to celebrate
them.6 Post and Johnson also see the violation of traditional assump-
tions noted by Burk as a challenge; their admirably ambitious re-
sponse is no less than to call for, and attempt to initiate, a search for
new fundamental organizing ideas about the role of law. Their paper
presents a thought experiment that involves taking the "death of dis-
tance" seriously and trying to model its consequences. They note that
new technology creates new "spillover effects" across federal lines.7
As a result, in a federal world we all enjoy or suffer much greater
"non-congruence," in which the consequences of our actions are in-
creasingly unrelated to where we happen to be and in which states in-
creasingly lack jurisdiction over those creating effects felt on their
territory s In a world in which human interaction is free of (or has
greatly reduced) physical constraints, the authors ask what role law
plays in producing order and raising social welfare.
Burk suggests that actors in legal systems, like organisms in an
ecosystem, exhibit two basic responses to challenges such as the
Internet: voice or exit, "fight or flight." 9 (One might, however, adapt
the Post and Johnson metaphor of gardening and suggest that re-
gardless of what individuals do, a systemic perspective offers a third
possibility, one in which some organisms evolve to suit the changed
conditions; this is hard on individual organisms, but it can be good for
the ecosystem.)
Burk takes intellectual property law as his example, noting that
the almost costless copying and delivery of digitized goods and the
easy movement of (re)producers to any hospitable jurisdiction risks a
race to the bottom: without some means of protecting their creations
6. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 1049-53.
7. See Post & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1085.
8. See id. at 1085-86.
9. See Burk, supra note 4, at 944. Although it is not central to his main points, Burk
adopts the standard descriptions of voice and exit as applied to individuals. See id. I have some
doubts whether these descriptions work as well as they used to in a world of computerized pro-
filing and tracking. Profiling makes consumer exit difficult, since your reputation and actions
follow you perhaps forever; similarly, accounts of the reduced cost of voice may neglect the very
real silencing effect of knowing that your words may follow you forever and everywhere. It may
be that consumers will vote with their keyboards and create a new horde of virtual personae to
prevent this profiling. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information
Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395
(1996) (describing use, consequences, and potential regulation of anonymous identities on-line).
Consumer inertia suggests not, however.
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from pirates, the producers of digitizable intellectual property will
have a sub-optimal financial incentive to produce their wares. 0 More
generally, Burk suggests that the competition among jurisdictions for
highly mobile intellectual property producing businesses enables a
classic race to the bottom among regulators, particularly in the "mar-
ket" for intellectual property law."
Burk suggests that both the political/legal system and the market
system respond when faced with a technological development that
threatens established market relationships, indeed threatens market
failure. 2 Individual firms can react by exiting the market or can exer-
cise "voice," which essentially means either moaning loudly or at-
tempting to persuade others that their complaints are justified. Gov-
ernments do not so easily have the option of exit, and voice-
whatever that means at the national level-is also not likely to be
enormously effective on its own against regulatory arbitragers or
competing regulators.
Thus, the key point: Burk suggests that a government which finds
itself in a regulatory race to the bottom because its attractiveness is
being undermined by new technology is likely to respond to this
n-player Prisoner's Dilemma by a special type of "fight."' 3 Govern-
ments threatened with regulatory arbitrage will club together to form
mutually binding international agreements designed to stop in-
ter-jurisdictional regulatory competition. 4 In short, new information
technology encourages internationalization, a supra-national re-
sponse designed to keep the status quo in place or restore the status
quo ante.
Burk opines that this flight to supra-national agreement is easily
overdone, noting that recent international agreements on intellectual
property topics have results that threaten to be sub-optimal, perhaps
because of capture or rent-seeking by organized interest groups.15
These agreements do put a floor on any race to the bottom, but they
also create an artificial ceiling on any struggle to the top. Worse,
given the wealth effects of any given distribution of property rights,
the strong tendency is towards agreements that either freeze the
status quo ante, or favor the existing rights-holders because they are
10. See Burk, supra note 4, at 957-58.
11. See id. at 969-70.
12. See id. at 970.
13. See id. at 972-73.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 976-77.
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the parties with both the means and the incentive to lobby for the
agreements at the national and international level.
In contrast, Perritt seems considerably more optimistic about the
causes and probable consequences of the rise of supra-nationality.
He sees supra-nationality as part of "the movement of the interna-
tional community toward rule-based behavior through the rule of law
strand of democracy, its movement to rationalize free trade, and its
movement to give effect to arms control" rather than a result of
grubby rent-seeking. 6
Falling somewhere between Burk and Perritt, Post and Johnson
model a world of adaptive walks in "patched"" systems that is evoca-
tive of "muddling through" under federalism."i Their "Gardener's
Dilemma" model suggests that when wealth maximizing decisions are
taken on a state-by-state basis, but the effects of those actions spill
across borders (i.e., "congruence" 9 is low), social welfare is lower
than a system where all variables are internalized. 20 This is a result
not unlike what one would expect from the predictions of neo-
classical economic theory, and indeed the policy problem posed by
the Gardener's Dilemma model is very similar to the intellectual
property regulation problem described by Burk: how can politicians,
legal theorists, or other designers of rules compensate for the de-
coupling of geography and the effective reach of many rules. In ear-
lier articles, Post and Johnson propose an answer, in which some par-
ties form what one might call a non-geographical "patch"-in effect
create a new jurisdiction called "cyberspace.
2
The concept of non-jurisdictional patching is not inherently im-
plausible or impossible. In Israel, for example, the relevant "patch"
16. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 1032.
17. See Post & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1076-78. The authors define a patch as an arbi-
trary (think, "geographical") subset of the total set of elements. See id. at 1076. Individual ele-
ments will be permitted to move from one state to another if, but only if, the effect of the move
on the aggregate fitness of the members of its patch is a positive one. See id. at 1076-77. Effects
on elements outside the patch are ignored. See id. at 1078.
18. See id. at 1090.
19. Congruence is a measure of the extent to which the state of elements in this patch affect
the well-being of elements in other patches ("spillover"). See id. at 1080. High congruence
means that members of this patch do not tend to affect elements in other patches (think,
"autarky"); low congruence means that the state of elements in this patch has a high affect
abroad (think "Internet"). See id. at 1080-81.
20. See id. at 1086.
21. See Burk, supra note 4, at 961; Post & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1086.
22. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The New "Civic Vir-
tue" of the Internet, in THE EMERGING INTERNET 25 (1998).
1998]
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for matters of status and family is religion, and these matters are
largely regulated by separate confessional authorities and adjudicated
by separate religious courts.23 In the Ottoman Empire, the legal sys-
tem established a confessional divide that granted limited privileges
to confessional courts over penal matters involving members of their
communities, especially matters involving violations of religious law.2"
Under various treaties imposed on the Ottoman Empire from the six-
teenth century onward, all civil and criminal cases between foreign
non-Muslims of the same nationality were tried before that state's
ambassador or consul under the foreign state's law; criminal charges
against a non-Muslim foreigner arising from an offense against an Ot-
toman subject were referred to special courts.25 Just because it is pos-
sible, however, does not make it desirable; the victory of the English
King's courts over the concurrent ecclesiastical jurisdiction is still
seen as a healthy victory in many quarters despite leaving one open to
the charge of a Whiggish reading of history. Post and Johnson's sug-
gestion elsewhere that "cyberspace" can usefully be thought of as a
new jurisdiction has been justly criticized. 6 Even if it were desirable,
there is no particular reason to expect that existing geographically
oriented and often federal systems will choose to recognize a cyber-
jurisdiction. If nothing else, we can be grateful that this resistance to
change will spare Internet lawyers from having to take yet another
bar exam.
The juxtaposition of the Post and Johnson paper's top-down
search for general theoretical principles with Burk's build-up ap-
proach from very concrete examples raises questions for both: to
what extent are the developments Burk describes in IP law represen-
tative of more general trends in the effects of the Internet on markets
and the legal system? By using IP has Burk (and for that matter Post
and Johnson27) focused on a special, perhaps extreme, case? Simi-
23. See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 321 (5th ed. 1988).
24. See URIEL HEYD, STUDIES IN OLD OTTOMAN CRIMINAL LAW 222-23 (V.L. Mdnage
ed., 1973).
25. See id. at 223-24.
26. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998). It
seems quite odd to me to want to subject transactions that happen to use a computer to a unique
legal system inapplicable to transactions that use telephones, fax machines, vehicular transport,
or even shoe leather. We do not find concepts such as "telephonespace" or "autospace" helpful,
and for good reason; cyberspace too is not a place, but only a metaphor-often an unhelpful
one. Not only would such a rule likely be inequitable, since computer use is correlated with in-
come, but those with the option of using a computer could manipulate the law applicable to a
given transaction.
27. See Post & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1064-68.
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larly, are Post and Johnson right that the acknowledged problems of
cyberspace governance raise fundamental issues, or is their model
really applicable only, or even mostly, to information and service
goods since they are the only ones for which distance is dead?
There is certainly a case to be made that Burk has chosen a
uniquely convenient example for his thesis. As I have argued else-
where, information is a special good.28 It, and services such as film-
making or legal advice which can be embodied in information, ships
invisibly29 and (today at least) at a very low marginal cost. Other
goods do not work that way: shipping is not invisible but instead
rather easy to monitor, track, and even tax. And shipping is anything
but free.
On the other hand, there is also a strong case that IP law is rea-
sonably representative of a more general phenomenon. The rise of
the information and service economy suggests that the knowledge in-
dustries are the ones which matter most, at least in the richest na-
tions. IP law is not in any way unique when it comes to the ability of
nations and interest groups to band together internationally to com-
pensate for the destabilizing effects of the jurisdictional spill-over
caused by cheap and easy communication technology. A similar story
can be, and indeed has been, told about international tax" and inter-
national money laundering rules,31 and no doubt will be told about
many other areas of law such as banking, securities, and consumer
28. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 129 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997), available on-line
(visited Aug. 28, 1998) <http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm>.
29. Post and Johnson suggest that the locations of individuals using the Internet are not
readily apparent or even easily determined either ex ante or ex post. See Post & Johnson, supra
note 2, at 1058 & n.4. I think, however, this oversimplifies, as it depends on who is doing the
looking. The parties to a transaction each know where they themselves are. They are capable
of negotiating for relevant details about each other, and for satisfactory authenticating details or
testimonials. Third parties may not know where the two parties are, but that is a rather different
problem.
30. See, e.g., Jeffrey Owens, Electronic Commerce: The Challenges to Tax Authorities and
Taxpayers, Paper Delivered at University of Miami School of Law, Third Annual International
Tax Institute (Feb. 21, 1998).
31. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE CONTROL OF MONEY LAUNDERING 113 (1995) (OTA-ITC-630);
Christopher D. Hoffman, Note, Encrypted Digital Cash Transfers: Why Traditional Money
Laundering Controls May Fail Without Uniform Cryptography Regulations, 21 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 799 (1998); Scott E. Mortman, Note, Putting Starch in European Efforts to Combat Money
Laundering, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S429 (1992) (discussing European Commission's directive on
money laundering); Phyllis Solomon, Note, Are Money Launderers All Washed Up in the West-
ern Hemisphere? The OAS Model Regulations, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 433
(1994) (discussing money laundering provisions of Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Com-
mission's Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Traf-
ficking and Related Offenses).
1998]
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law in the future. Indeed, short of the expensive strategy of outright
suppression of the Internet and related technologies,32 international
or supra-national cooperation appear to be the only strategies likely
to allow interests harmed by new technology to replicate a substantial
part of the status quo ante. Alas, there is little reason to suspect that
IP law is unique as to the public choice (i.e., "rent-seeking") dynamic
that may drive national policies. Established interests that profit
from a given legal regime will ordinarily be the ones with the most
cash to spend on lobbying and other activities designed to lock in
their advantages or to head off upstart competitors using upstart
technologies.
It seems reasonable therefore to accept the IP example as repre-
sentative of something more general, at least to see where it takes
us-even if it takes us as far as Post and Johnson. If IP is typical we
can expect that the laws and rules relating to the economic and legal
regimes most affected by the Internet will be a leading part of the
complex set of phenomena known as globalization. If states are not
going to quietly wither away, either in whole or part, the question
then becomes how exactly states will go about the common task of
accomplishing what Post and Johnson would call re-coupling.33 Per-
ritt and Burk suggest in different ways that supra-national re-coupling
is the most likely possibility.3' Even though the absence of significant
relevant international agreements outside the area of cooperative law
enforcement requires that one reserve judgment, there seems to be
no reason to believe that there is anything unique about the unhappy
welfare effects of international agreements designed to prevent
regulatory arbitrage in IP. The prospect of a series of international
agreements designed to freeze existing law in place for the benefit of
entrenched interests is not heartening.
35
32. Whether or not suppression is expensive in terms of expenditures, it is likely to be very
expensive in terms of opportunity costs. Among the losses are lost gains to research from easy
international collaboration, lost ability to lower transaction costs for searching and selling via
e-commerce, and lost efficiencies in the labor market from international competition and do-
mestic tele-commuting.
33. See Post & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1088 n.68.
34. See Burk, supra note 4, at 985; Perritt, supra note 3, at 1051-53. Imperialism and con-
quest are other logical possibilities with undesirable properties.
35. Burk himself appears more sanguine about this than I, at least in the context of interna-
tional trademark law. See Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce,
49 S.C. L. REV. 695 (1998).
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II. THE GLOBALIZING INTERNET
This discussion of international processes brings us to Perritt's
discussion of the globalizing effects of the Internet. Contrary to the
pessimism above, Dean Perritt finds generally happy consequences
for international society in general and international lawmaking pro-
cesses in particular. Perritt notes cheerfully that the Internet is likely
to increase "cultural diffusion."36 Although this fits my intuition, one
can see countervailing trends. Diasporic groups which might other-
wise homogenize into dominant local cultures may find it much easier
to preserve their traditional language, culture, and identity when it is
cheap and easy to communicate with other far-flung members of the
linguistic and cultural group. Even if one accepts the forecast of a
global cultural melting pot, one must ask how many people outside
the culture(s) likely to dominate-read "the U.S. and maybe
Europe"-may experience this as the ultimate assault of U.S. cultural
imperialism.
I have doubts too about Perritt's assertion that the Internet sig-
nificantly facilitates legal harmonization.37 One can imagine three
types of harmonization. De facto, or bottom-up, harmonization oc-
curs when individuals engage in regulatory arbitrage and find that,
like it or not, their rules are determined by foreigners. While I think
this likely in some cases, this is certainly not what Perritt has in mind.
The second type, top-down harmonization, occurs via international
agreement, or supra-national regulation such as found in the Euro-
pean Union. Perritt predicts and celebrates the third type, true hori-
zontal harmonization. 9 In this model, states adopt best practices of
regulation from each other as one good example begets another. Per-
ritt is surely right that one of the standard arguments used by regula-
tory reformers and rent-seekers alike is that "foreigners do it bet-
ter." ' It is also certainly true that national law is increasingly easily
found on-line; it seems plausible that easy access will cause some
slight increase in the propensity to agitate for the adoption of foreign
rules.41 It is less than obvious, however, whether rules transplanted
36. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 1035-36.
37. See id. at 1040-42.
38. See Froomkin, supra note 28, at 142, 151.
39. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 1040, 1050.
40. See id. at 1040.
41. For a short description of an attempt to enable a related phenomenon-allowing
foreigners to comment on draft domestic rules before they are enacted-see European
Commission, Information Society: Transparency Directive Adopted (last modified July 29, 1998)
1998]
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from the original regulatory contexts are likely to produce the same
results as in their original legal environment, or instead more likely to
cause facile misunderstandings based on quotations out of context.
A rule often depends on context for efficacy; 43 removed from the en-
vironment in which it evolved and from the various checks and bal-
ances that surround it, a transplanted rule may have effects as benign
as the first rabbits in Australia.
Perritt also foresees optimistic consequences for the rule of law
in the international arena. He adopts the perspective of "regime the-
ory"44 that "democratization increases the potency of international
law" because "international law as rhetoric influences masses more
than it influences leadership cadres., 45 In this view, for example, the
East Block lost the Cold War because it was undermined by frus-
trated domestic consumer demand.46 Regime theory has become
fashionable in international relations departments, but I nonetheless
would proceed with some caution. Even if one accepts, as the evi-
dence demonstrates, that there is a correlation between deployment
of the Internet and democracy, 7 this does not tell us which is cause
and which is effect. Nor does it necessarily follow that adherence to
the rule of law at the international level is a consequence of democ-
racy. One need only contemplate a few unhappy incidents in U.S.
history to be reminded of this uncomfortable truth.
As the access to the Internet increases, so too, Perritt posits, will
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/infso/transp.htm> (describing adoption of Directive
on transparency mechanism for "Information Society services," which will require that draft
national rules that concern Information Society services be notified to the Commission and then
held for a three-month "standstill" period of comment by all interested parties).
42. For an argument that misunderstandings are common, see Caroline Bradley, Transat-
lantic Misunderstandings: Corporate Law and Societies, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming Mar.
1999).
43. See id.
44. "[R]egime theory assumes rational self-interest on the part of states. In other words,
regime theory presumes that governments have interests and preferences independent of the
personal interests of the interest groups, politicians, and bureaucrats who determine governmen-
tal policy." Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International
Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 930-31
(1996). Recently, however, some regime theorists have argued for increasing attention to inter-
est groups within the state. See, e.g., Richard Sinnott, Integration Theory, Subsidiarity and the
Internationalization of Issues: The Implication for Legitimacy (visited Nov. 5, 1998) <http://
www.ecsanet.org/conferences/3rsinnot.htm>.
45. Perritt, supra note 3, at 998, 1037.
46. See id. at 1035-36.
47. See Christopher Kedzie, International Implications for Global Democratization, in
UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO E-MAIL: FEASIBILITY AND SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS 151 (1995), avail-
able on-line (visited Aug. 28, 1998) <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR650/mr650.ch6/
ch6.html>.
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access to global norms48 and, as a result, existing institutions that form
part of the global norm-forming process will tend to work better.
Perritt sees part of this benefit as deriving from the spread of infor-
mation about treaty obligations: "[M]ost people conduct their affairs
so as to comply with legal norms they know about. Making it easier
for them to know the norms either directly or through their counsel
increases the likelihood of compliance. '' 49 I confess, I find this unper-
suasive: I do not get the impression that the challenge to the rule of
law in international affairs is caused by ignorance of private parties as
to treaties. For one thing, relatively few treaties affect private parties
directly; most concern public rather than private international law,
and even fewer are self-executing. Most at least require implement-
ing legislation or regulation at the national level, and I doubt that ig-
norance of national law is a significant source of international law-
lessness.
Rather than being a problem of ignorance, the problem of pri-
vate violation of obligations to foreigners, or of obligations arising
under extra-territorial application of foreign law, is, I would submit,
more one of conscious choice, of clashing calculations of efficient
breach or of what one can get away with. Furthermore, the infrac-
tions most likely to have widespread and serious consequences are
not of private international law, but of public international law. In
this realm, it is governments, not private citizens, who are the likely
violators, and they tend to be quite fully aware of international trea-
ties and other obligations; if they are not, the Internet is not going to
educate them.
Perritt seems on stronger ground on the issue of compliance with
public international law when he endorses Harold Koh's suggestion °
that voluntary compliance of nations with international norms will in-
crease as international elites and domestic constituencies internalize
international norms." Global cultural homogenization, plus the ease
with which populations can communicate directly, may well increase
the pressure on governments to comply with international norms, and
48. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 1038-39. Perritt does not tell us how he expects existing
norms to spill over to the new medium, or for that matter how new norms might be expected to
form. For example, Perritt notes that there is now an international norm that postal mail will
not be inspected outside the country of origin, see id. at 1020-21, but does not explain-because
it is no part of his agenda in this paper-how or whether one might fit e-mail into this norm.
49. Perritt, supra note 3, at 1039; see also id. at 1042-44.
50. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2645-50 (1997).
51. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 1036-37.
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the Internet may make demonizing some opponents more difficult.
I would even be willing to take the point a step further and argue
that in the case of domestic law regulating conduct with potential ex-
traterritorial effects such as the regulation of financial services, do-
mestic interest groups often will have a strong incentive to urge their
governments to comply with selected international norms. Some-
times this may be due to fear of foreign-sponsored retaliation such as
government or even private boycotts and blacklists. More frequently,
I would argue, it will arise from the competitive features of a world of
easy mobility of capital, businesses, and customers in which commu-
nications give even immobile customers a worldwide choice of suppli-
ers of information and financial services. If interest groups in some,
perhaps many, jurisdictions will not push their governments to strug-
gle to the "top" of regulation, they will at least seek a sufficiently high
plateau to avoid the bad reputation that they fear attaches to notori-
ous violators. I found it striking to behold bankers and regulators in
Caribbean tax shelters preaching the gospel of cooperation with in-
ternational anti-money laundering efforts because "bad money drives
out good."52
Perritt also predicts that new types of sanctions and adjudication
will arise to "enforce international norms against violators. 5 3 Alas,
the new forms turn out to be e-mailing the old forms, 4 the rather un-
frequented virtual magistrate,55 and cyber-settlement of specifically
Internet-related issues such as domain name disputes. The new sanc-
tions are little more than the familiar tools of boycott and bad public-
ity, albeit energized by new communications technology. Taken as a
group, it is all a little underwhelming.
This quibbling pales, however, in the face of one trend that Per-
ritt rightly suggests is potentially transformative. If the rule of law
must struggle along as it always has, the same cannot be said of
non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"). Already of increasing
52. This comment was related to me by a banker in the Cayman Islands and echoed by sev-
eral others during a visit in 1998. I heard similar comments in a visit to Anguilla in 1997.
53. Perritt, supra note 3, at 1044.
54. See id.
55. For an account of the virtual magistrate by one of the founder-members, see Robert
Gellman, A Brief History of the Virtual Magistrate Project: The Early Months, 44 LA. B.J. 430
(1997). The virtual magistrate has heard only one case to date, the Tierney case, see Tierney v.
EMail America, Corp. (visited July 7, 1998) <http://vmag.vcilp.org/cases/decided.html>, and that
was a matter brought by a participant and decided in a default judgement. Cf. Alejandro E.
Almaguer & Roland W. Baggott III, Note, Shaping New Legal Frontiers: Dispute Resolution for
the Internet, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 711, 730 (1998) ("The Tierney case is riddled with
problems that reflect on the credibility and the efficacy of the Virtual Magistrate Project.").
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importance in international affairs, they are the big winners from the
Internet and other communications technologies. When the cost of
organizing disparate groups and communicating directly with popula-
tions without (and despite) governments is drastically reduced, NGOs
find their effectiveness increased. Churches, human rights groups,
professional and scientific associations, and international activists of
every stripe are empowered as never before. Perritt is surely correct
to draw attention to this phenomenon.56
Thus, one can agree with Perritt's assertion that the Internet ac-
celerates the move away from the state-centric tradition without
agreeing with every part of his account of how this happens. Even if
one agrees that private international law norms increasingly will be
drawn from the global commons,57 or even that some quasi-public
norms relating to environmental law or human rights will increasingly
resemble a form of private international law enforced by private insti-
tutions, one need not go so far as to predict the death of public inter-
national law.58 While it is true that states increasingly rely on NGOs
to alleviate the human suffering caused by wars, famine, and various
policy failures, that does not mean that NGOs will expand to a point
where they are able to prevent serious state- (or proto-state-) spon-
sored human rights breaches such as civil war in the former Yugosla-
via, collapse of civil society in Haiti, or genocide in Rwanda-prob-
lems that both existing private organizations and the current state
system seem to find overwhelming.
If the Internet accelerates the move away from our state-centric
tradition, the question becomes what will fill the void. At one point,
Perritt suggests that subsidiarity, the devolution of responsibility to
smaller political units in the context of a federal system, will do it:
"The greater visibility of higher levels of government encourages reli-
ance on those higher levels to help solve problems. The Internet
changes that."59 At other times, Perritt seems to agree with the impli-
cations of the Burk and Post and Johnson papers when he admits that
56. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 1046-49.
57. One could ask how much of this is new in light of the long tradition of lex mercatoria,
but that is a different debate. Cf. Bernardo M. Cremades, The Impact of International Arbitra-
tion on the Development of Business Law, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 526 (1983) (discussing lex merca-
toria); Hans-Joachim Mertens, Lex Mercatoria: A Self-Applying System Beyond National Law?,
in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 31 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997) (same); Gunther Teubner,
'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE,
supra, at 3 (describing role of lex mercatoria and advocating greater use).
58. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 1050.
59. Id. at 1051.
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to date power seems to be shifting not down, but upwards to interna-
tional organizations.6°
III. THE GREAT LOOMING INTERNET IRONY
Collectively, and I think unintentionally, these papers suggest the
existence of a great looming Internet irony: what was intended and
promoted as the great anarchistic, liberating, democratizing technol-
ogy may in fact spur a reaction so strong as to make the world signifi-
cantly less democratic. If indeed governments and vested interests
conclude that the only way in which they can maintain their position
is to band together with like-minded counterparts in other countries
to enact multi-lateral treaties or vest increasing power in su-
pra-national organizations, the power of existing democratic institu-
tions will be reduced worldwide.
This outcome is of course far from certain. For if the supra-
national reaction to the threat of international regulatory arbitrage is
to be effective, the very large majority of the nations in the world will
have to agree to participate in the multi-lateral treaties or the supra-
national bodies. If even a few economically significant nations with
good connectivity decide to remain aloof, the others will have to de-
cide whether they are able to retaliate and whether they wish to. Pos-
sible forms of retaliation include cutting telecommunications links
and expelling the offender nation from international financial clear-
ing systems-both options I have heard openly discussed by senior
international bureaucrats, at least in the context of international of-
fensives against tax havens and jurisdictions that enable money laun-
dering. Once the OECD nations agree to a policy among themselves,
there are few other nations which would choose to stand up to such
pressure.
Once enacted, treaties are hard to amend; the votes of the citi-
zens of one party are by definition insufficient to affect them. Su-
pra-national bodies also tend to have a "democratic deficit."6 Most
60. See id. at 1042-44.
61. "Democratic deficit" originally referred to the lack of democratic accountability in the
political structure of the European Community/European Union and the relatively weak powers
of the democratically elected European Parliament as compared to other unelected institutions
such as the Commission, the Council, the Court, and now the Bank. See, e.g., IAN WARD, A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LAW 48-51 (1996); Kevin Featherstone, Jean Monnet
and the 'Democratic Deficit' in the European Union, 32 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 149 (1994);
JOrgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,
12 PRAXIS INT'L 1, 7-13 (1992).
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commonly national governments appoint delegates to international
bodies.62 Thus, in even the most democratic countries, a delegate to
an international body is twice removed from the people, being only a
representative of elected representatives much like the U.S. Senate
before the Seventeenth Amendment.63 When the international body's
decisions are collective and delegates from undemocratic regimes sit
side by side with those from democratic states, the body as a whole is
even less democratic, and the power of citizens around the world is
further reduced.
The possibility of a reaction to the liberal and centrifugal ten-
dencies of the Internet with such potentially anti-democratic results
reinforces the need for "new paradigms" regarding the effect of
cheap communication on domestic and international society. The
three papers in this session tend more towards something akin to
Thomas Kuhn's concept of normal science, that is "research firmly
based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements
that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as
supplying the foundation for its further practice. ' Burk accepts the
familiar information-producers-need-incentives model that drives
much contemporary legal and economic writing about intellectual
61property as one of his premises. Perritt sees information technology
providing new ways of doing familiar law-jobs in the foreign offices
and legal departments of the world, but the actual work being done in
those offices is essentially unchanged.6 Post and Johnson are suitably
bold in their desire for "new ways of thinking about existing theo-
ries," but admit that they have found no escaping the old problems of
62. The European Parliament is an exception. Its members are directly elected by the vot-
ers of member states of the European Union. The Parliament is, however, one of the weakest
elements of the EU's governance structure. See WARD, supra note 61, at 18-19, 32, 39 (de-
scribing weaknesses of European Parliament relative to Council of Ministers, Commission, and
European Court of Justice).
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for direct election of Senators who had for-
merly been chosen by state legislators pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1).
64. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1970).
Kuhn himself limited his purview to physical sciences; I am aware that there is a debate as to
whether it is appropriate to use his ideas, even metaphorically, for social sciences.
65. See Burk, supra note 4, at 956-57. But see Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing
Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1997) (describing GNU General
Public License, "which prevents users from establishing proprietary rights in either the works
themselves or subsequent versions thereof"). See generally GNU General Public License (vis-
ited Aug. 28, 1998) <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.html> (official text of public license);
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Con-
sent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989) (discussing moral and economic
foundations of copyright protection).
66. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 1039, 1044.
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interpersonal utility comparison and the difficulties of modeling com-
plex dynamic systems. I take all this normalcy as a sign that Internet
Law has come of age-perhaps too soon.
I have carefully managed to exhaust my allotment of space and
time without giving much hint of what these new paradigms might
look like, and the reader's suspicions about this strategy are probably
justified. One might attempt to reconstitute the assumptions under-
lying IP law on a different economic model, or different assumptions
about human nature. Perhaps Burk's mention of the economic im-
portance of "pocket parts" such as updates, bugfixes, patches, and
new OS compatibility is only the tip of the iceberg. For example,
some software companies sell their wares (or a basic version of their
wares) for very little, and seem to think that they will make their
profits selling upgrades, help desk services, or other ancillary services,
or collecting information about their customers and selling that. Per-
haps more attention needs to be paid to non-economic forms of status
as an incentive to produce valuable information. The alternate incen-
tive could be something as traditional as the British system of
knighthoods, lordships, and other non-monetary honors, as modern
as informal anointment as a net.deity, or as orthogonal as a partial re-
turn to gift-exchange. 68
An even more fruitful area of research might be the relationship
between Internet governance and other models of social order. I
think Post and Johnson are right to try to build models, although the
stark simplicity of their model and the very counter-factual assump-
tions on which it is built make me uncomfortable with this as anything
but the first step the authors carefully say it is. The reality with which
I am familiar is not one in which gardeners or anyone else sow their
67. See Post & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1070-72.
68. See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 128 (arguing "in-
formation wants to be free" and hence intellectual property law is increasingly anachronistic);
Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace (TPRC Working Paper, 1997), available on-line (vis-
ited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://149.150.190.246/shla/professor/FILES/Dan%20Burk/Scholarship/
MUDDY1.WPD> (suggesting that "informal transactions or 'self-help' may be the most effi-
cient means for provision of digital works" rather than bright-line legal rules); Esther Dyson,
Intellectual Value, WIRED, July 1995, at 136 (arguing that the Internet causes "intellectual assets
and property [to] depreciate while intellectual processes and services appreciate"); cf. GEORGE
A. AKERLOF, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, in AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK
OF TALES 145 (1984) (economic analysis of functioning of gift-exchange markets). But see Julie
E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management", 97
MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998) (attacking property rights-based approaches to cyberspace regula-
tion); Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509, 520-22 (1996)
(warning that move to some versions of gift-exchange model may have unexpected and undesir-
able consequences).
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seed randomly. We are all-even players on the Internet - inheritors
of very significant amounts of history, cultural conventions, social
memes, and various formal and informal standards. Indeed, one im-
pressionistic reading of the Post and Johnson results suggests that
even their simple model reflects this reality. If patching algorithms
find it difficult to go from "fairly good" to "best" results, does this
perhaps reflect the grubby reality of rent-seeking, lobbying, and
first-mover advantages in which entrenched interests in a functioning
present sometimes stand as an impediment to a better and
closer-to-optimum future?
The welfare maximization game we play, and which governments
either play or regulate, very rarely starts with a blank slate. The
Internet, alas, is no exception to this very fundamental principle.

